Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers

 Paper One: Appiah and Moral Relativism

In the book Cosmopolitanism: Ethics In A World Of Strangers, Kwame Anthony Appiah explores a broad scope of topics in relation to the responsibilities and understanding of individuals in a growing and expanding world. He details multiple examples and thought-provoking narratives on the nature of culture and respect, but one of his most interesting topics is the existence, study, and effects of moral relativism.

Moral relativism as a topic can be observed outside of Appiah’s work, but his specific perspective on the view incorporates values from logical positivism: a philosophical movement which seeks to define “right” and “wrong” as solely within scientific bounds. Appiah’s incorporation of positivist views expands moral relativism to an intriguing degree. He mentions on page 22 that “there are facts and there are values… Unlike values, facts… are the natural inhabitants of the world, the things that scientists can study or that we can explore with our own senses.” With this statement, Appiah combines the moral relativist views of individual right and wrong with the boundaries of positivist definitions of true and false.

In anthropological studies, or simply in philosophy as a whole, a wealth of values and judgments can be observed, both among researchers themselves and their subjects. In this case, it is not surprising that people may carry Appiah’s definition of moral relativism as a primary value. To observe whether an action one commits is “right” or “wrong,” there must be pre-set boundaries that define how topics are to be judged. In this case, we can observe Appiah’s statements on pages 18-20 that define beliefs and desires, the former of which being a view on “how the world is,” and the latter being “how we’d like it to be.” In the following passages, this view is explored, elaborating on the connections made to produce this view. While Appiah’s definition may not be commonplace, there are many reasons why it may make sense to an individual’s personal observation. Thinkers who have explored and elaborated on moral relativism as a general subject were given a set of simple boundaries, a lens with which to view individual decisions. These boundaries allow each observer to examine cases individually, and while this may not be the most effective method for understanding, it simplifies the process of exploring morality in traits and actions.

While moral relativism may seek to individualize concepts and occurrences, that may not be the most productive route with respect to cosmopolitanism, or to cultural identity. As mentioned by Appiah: “The Positivist picture, in short, seems to generalize too quickly from one kind of belief: beliefs about the properties of particular concrete things that you can see, hear, touch, smell or feel” (Appiah 23).  In this simple critique, Appiah highlights the detail that many Positivist, and in this case moral relativist, views are quick to announce scientific facts, but ignore the factual meanings that can be attributed to societally constructed concepts. I believe that this is the most glaring issue with Positivism as a whole, if only because it removes nuance from the discussion altogether. While yes, some actions and beliefs can be easily defined as “wrong” due to tangible scientific facts, there are many still that require more tact to prove.

In aligning with Appiah’s moral relativism, a thinker limits themself to what has been proven on an individual basis, creating a strict set of guidelines with which to view the world and decisions made by citizens within. I do not believe that investigation of the morality of actions done by individuals is at all to be ignored, but there is a broader scope that we as knowledgable thinkers have access to, and it would be unwise to allow any black-and-white view to have too much weight. We are individuals and have individual experiences, but the meaning we give to the world around us is equally as valuable as the actions we commit.